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Fraudulent activity within the workplace is widespread. One recent survey1 found 
that five percent of respondents had witnessed “falsification or misrepresentation of 
financial records” within the past year.2 Another provides evidence that this number is 
three times as great for those specifically involved in accounting and finance.3 The costs 
of such abuses are tremendous. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2006 
Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse estimates that companies are 
losing approximately five percent of their revenue to occupational fraud,4 which equals 
$652 billion each year.5  
Congress enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act to restore public trust in the markets. 
Among its ways of achieving this, Sarbanes Oxley attempts to improve organizational 
ethics by defining codes of ethics as including the promotion of “honest and ethical 
                                                                                                                                                              
1. This survey had a sample size of 3,015 responses, which included respondents that varied 
in employer size and industry, job position, tenure, and other characteristics.  Ethics Resource Center, 
National Business Ethics Survey: How Employee View Ethics In their Organizations 1994–2005 99–
107 (2005) [hereinafter NBES] (providing a description of the methodology and the characteristics of the 
respondents and their organizations).  
2. NBES, supra note 1, at 25. This number was unchanged from the NBES survey in 2003. 
Id. 
3. KPMG Forensic, Integrity Survey 2005–2006 4 (2006) (available online at 
http://www.404institute.com/). For an overview of the techniques firms use to manage earnings, see Mark 
W. Nelson et al., How are Earnings Managed? Examples from Auditors, 17 Accounting Horizons 17 
(2003). 
4. The ACFE defines occupational fraud as, ““The use of one’s occupation for personal 
enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or 
assets.” Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2006 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse 6 (2006) (available online at: http://www.acfe.com/fraud/report.asp). The report further 
classifies occupation fraud into the categories of: asset misappropriation (theft of the organization’s assets), 
corruption (an employee using their position in an organization to obtain a benefit contrary to their duty to 
that organization), and fraudulent statements (falsifying financial statements to make the organization look 
more profitable than it is). Id. at 10–11. 
5. Id. at 4 and 8. 
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conduct,” requiring disclosure on the codes that apply to senior financial officers,6 and 
including provisions to encourage whistle blowing.7 The Securities Exchange 
Commission’s implementing rules expand the disclosure requirement on code of ethics to 
include codes that apply to the Chief Executive Officer and further develop the definition 
of a code of ethics.8  In addition, Sarbanes Oxley mandated that the United States 
Sentencing Commission review the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG). 9 As a 
result of this review,10 the Commission modified the OSG to redefine an “effective” 
compliance program as one that includes efforts to “promote an organizational culture 
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”11 
Following the lead of Sarbanes Oxley, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
6. Sarbanes Oxley section 406 (a) (requiring corporations “to disclose whether or not, and if 
not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, applicable to 
its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar 
functions.”). Corporations are also required to disclose “any change in or waiver of the code of ethics for 
senior financial officers.” Sarbanes Oxley section 406(b). 
7. See Sarbanes Oxley section 301(4) (requiring audit committees to establish procedures 
for employees to submit concerns about questionable accounting practices); Sarbanes Oxley section 806 
(providing for protection of employee whistle blowers). 
8. Final Rule: Disclosure Required by sections 406 and 407; Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
8177; 34-47235, 17 C.F.R. §§228, 229 & 249 (23rd January, 2003). The final definition of a code of ethics 
requires:  
“written standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote: 
• Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of 
interest between personal and professional relationships; 
• Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and documents that a 
registrant files with, or submits to, the Commission and in other public communications made 
by the registrant; 
• Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations; 
• The prompt internal reporting to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code of 
violations of the code, and 
• Accountability for adherence to the code.” 
9. Sarbanes Oxley § 805(a)(5); see also §§ 905 and 1104. Sarbanes Oxley required that the 
Sentencing Commission review the guidelines to ensure they were “sufficient to deter and punish 
organizational criminal misconduct.” Sarbanes Oxley § 805(a)(5) 
10. Prior to Sarbanes Oxley, the U.S. Sentencing Commission was already planning a review 
of the guidelines due to the ten-year anniversary of the Guidelines. News Release, U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Sentencing Commission Convenes Organizational Guidelines Ad Hoc Advisory Group (Feb. 21, 
2002) (available online at: http://www.ussc.gov). 
11. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a) (2004).  
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NASDAQ both adopted listing requirements that compel firms to adopt and disclose 
codes of ethics for all directors, officers, and employees of the company.12
Many managers challenge such attempts to “legislate” ethical behavior, even if 
they recognize the importance of proactively managing the ethical environment of their 
firms.13 Some commentators argue that the methods used to attempt to improve a firm’s 
ethical behavior—codes of conduct and compliance programs—are ineffective and 
costly.14 Others claim that due to the ability of firms to adopt a compliance program 
without actually changing the firm’s operations, these mechanisms may actually lead to 
more illegal or unethical behavior.15
This paper assesses the ability of the above changes to reduce the incidence of 
fraud and to increase the reporting of financial misconduct. Approaching these issues in 
Part I, I look specifically at the individual decision-makers within the organization and 
the ethical problems they face.  For the purposes of this paper, that decision is whether or 
not to participate in fraudulent activity or to blow the whistle on those that do.16 To 
                                                                                                                                                              
12. Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to 
Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-48745 (November 4, 2003) (available online at: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.)  
13. See Letter from Robert S. Fine, General Counsel of Johnson & Johnson to the Advisory 
Group on Organizational Guidelines, May 16, 2002, at 2 (available online at: 
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/pubcom_302/PC_302.htm) (“it would be profoundly wrong  . . . to require that 
every organization include ethics as part of its compliance program”). 
14. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 Wash. U. L. Q. 487, 491 (2003) [hereinafter Krawiec Cosmetic Compliance].  
15. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1405–07 (1999). 
16. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ report finds that frauds are detected more 
often by tips (i.e., whistle blowers) than by audits (internal or external) or internal controls. Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, supra note 4, at 28–29 (finding that 34% of frauds were discovered by tips, and 
at least 64% of those tips were from employees (an additional 18% of tips were from anonymous sources, 
which likely included at least some employee tips)). For public corporations, tips accounted for 40% of 
detected frauds. Id. at 33. Tips are especially important for uncovering fraud committed by high level 
executives, who can more easily avoid internal controls than lower level employees. Id. at 29. Almost half 
of the cases of owner or executive fraud were detected by employees. Id. at 29. The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
fraud report also showed the importance of employee tips relative to internal controls or external audits. 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2002 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 
11 (2002) (available online at: http://www.acfe.com/fraud/report.asp) [hereinafter ACFE 2002].  
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understand the individual’s decision, I use of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). The 
TPB is a widely tested theory from the field of social-psychology. It is a parsimonious 
model but has significant power in explaining variations in intentions. The simplicity of 
the model also makes it useful for understanding and explaining the various studies that 
have been conducted on ethical behavior in organizations.  
In Part II, I move upward to the level of the organization and examine its 
influence on the employee’s intentions and behaviors. Part II. A reviews the research on 
managing ethics and compliance programs, while Part II.B analyzes compliance 
programs through the TPB.  With that understanding, Part III takes another step back to 
consider how legislation such as Sarbanes Oxley, or the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, does and can influence corporations to take actions that will improve the 
ethical behavior of their employees.  
I. Understanding Individual Ethical Decision Making in  
Organizations: The Theory of Planned Behavior 
Icek Ajzen developed the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)17 based on the 
earlier Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) that he developed with Martin Fishbein.18 The 
TPB claims that there are three determinants of a person’s intentions, which then 
determine a person’s actual behavior.19 First, there is a person’s attitude toward the 
behavior, which is a measure of the person’s evaluation of the behavior as “good” or 
                                                                                                                                                              
17. See generally Icek Ajzen, The Theory of Planned Behavior, 50 Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes 179 (1991). 
18. See generally Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and 
Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (1975). The Theory of Planned Behavior is an 
extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action, with the difference being the addition of the “perceived 
behavioral control” determinant. Lisa Beck & Icek Ajzen, Predicting Dishonest Behaviors using the Theory 
of Planned Behavior, 25 J. of Research in Personality 285, 286 (1991) 
19. Beck & Ajzen, supra note 18, at 286. There may be moderating variables that affect the 
relationship between a person’s intentions and their actual behaviors. See Icek Ajzen, Nature and 
Operations of Attitudes, 52 Annual Rev. of Psych. 27, 46–47 (2001). 
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“bad.”20 The antecedents of attitudes include both behavioral beliefs about the action and 
outcome evaluations. Behavioral beliefs are the expected consequences of a behavior 
(e.g., a belief that an act will increase my job security) and outcome evaluations are the 
actor’s assessment of those consequences (e.g., a belief that it is good to have job 
security).21 Second, a subjective norm refers to the social pressure a person feels from 
important others to perform or refrain from performing the behavior and to the person’s 
motivation to comply with those pressures.22 Third, there is the actor’s perceived 
behavioral control, which is a measure of the person’s ability to perform the behavior, 
based on their past experience, competence, and any expected obstacles they may face.23 
Although each determinant will have an impact on a person’s intentions towards a 
behavior, the relative importance of each determinant will vary based on the 
circumstances and the behavior studied. For example, two employees, each with a 
positive attitude towards whistle blowing, may engage in different behaviors if they face 
different social pressures in their environment. 
To improve the above model, Ajzen has suggested the inclusion of moral 
obligation as an additional determinant of intentions in situations where ethical behavior 
is involved.24 Moral obligations refer to a duty or obligation that “is sanctioned by one’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
20. Ajzen, supra note 17, at 188; Beck & Ajzen, supra note at 286.  
21. Annetta M. Gibson & Albert H. Frakes, Truth or Consequences: A Study of Critical 
Issues and Decision Making in Accounting, 16 J. of Bus. Ethics 16, 165 (1997). 
22. Ajzen, supra note 17, at 195. The antecedent to subjective norms are normative beliefs. 
Id. at 189, 195–96. 
23. Ajzen, supra note 17, at 182–84; Beck & Ajzen, supra note 18 at 286. The antecedents to 
perceived behavioral control are control beliefs. Ajzen, supra note 17, at 189, 196 (noting also that control 
beliefs can be based on the observation of the experience of others). Perceived behavioral control should 
also have a direct impact on behavior. Id. at 184–85. It should also be noted that with the TPB, each 
determinant is expected to influence the other determinants. See Id. at 182 (providing a figure representing 
TPB and indicating the reciprocal influences of the determinants). 
24. Ajzen, supra note 17, at 188.  
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conscience as right.”25 In addition to one’s own moral belief system, these moral 
obligations can come from laws, professional codes of ethics, and other similar sources.26 
Researchers have included this determinant in empirical studies: most find it a useful 
addition to the model, but some find that moral obligation functions primarily as an 
additional determinant of a person’s attitude.27  
Overall, hundreds of studies on a wide variety of issues have confirmed the value 
of the TPB (and the TRA).28 However, only a handful of studies have used these theories 
in studying organizational members’ decisions in business ethics situations.29 The studies, 
reviewed briefly in the next section, generally find strong support for these theories’ 
usefulness in understanding unethical behavior and whistle blowing. In addition, various 
other studies on organizational ethics that did not specifically use the TPB are directly 
relevant for helping us to understand how organizations’ influence these determinants 
both positively and negatively. 
                                                                                                                                                              
25. Nancy B. Kurland, Sales Agents and Clients: Ethics, Incentives, and a Modified Theory 
of Planned Behavior, 49 Human Relations 51, 59 (1996) [hereinafter Kurland, Sales Agent]. 
26. Id.
27. Mark Conner & Christopher J. Armitage, Extending the Theory of Planned Behavior: A 
Review and Avenues for Further Research, 28 J. of Applied Soc. Psych. 1429, 1442–44 (1998) 
28. For a review of these studies, see Conner & Armitage, supra note 27. For an introduction 
to the research methodologies, see Jillian J. Francis et al., Constructing Questionnaires Based on the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (2004) (available online at: http://www.rebeqi.org/?pageID=40&ItemID=86 ). To 
measure intentions and the predictor variables of intentions, researchers construct questionnaires that ask 
respondents both direct and indirect questions related to the variable of interest. Id. at 9.  
29. On the potential and challenges of using the Theory of Reasoned Action for business 
ethics empirical research, see generally Donna M. Randall, Taking Stock: Can the Theory of Reasoned 
Action Explain Unethical Conduct?, 11 J. of Bus. Ethics 873 (1989). 
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A. Fraud and Whistle Blowing in TPB Studies 
Studies using the TPB30 have looked at the intentions of public accountants31 and 
Chief Financial Officers to engage in fraud,32 and managers to violate GAAP.33 These 
studies all find support for the TPB model in predicting intentions, and also find that 
among the determinants, attitudes have the greatest impact on intentions.34 In one study, 
the researchers were able to manipulate the three determinants with a positive or negative 
influence, which then affected the actor’s intention.35 For example, the researchers 
manipulated attitude by telling the research subjects that the corporation specifically 
encouraged (or discouraged) the GAAP violation used in the study.36 Although the above 
studies generally did not include the moral obligation determinant, Kurland’s37 studies on 
the intention of insurance sales agents to disclose information to prospective buyers38 
                                                                                                                                                              
30. For the purposes of this paper, the term TPB will also include studies that use the TRA. 
31. Howard F. Buchan, Ethical Decision Making in the Public Accounting Profession: An 
Extension of Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, 61 J. of Bus. Ethics 165 (2005); Gibson & Frakes, 
supra note . Buchan treats the firm’s ethical climate as a separate determinant of intentions, as opposed to 
influencing the subjective norms determinant. Buchan, supra, at 169–170. In addition, Buchan includes a 
variable for moral sensitivity for moral obligation. Id. at 168. The vignettes used in the study by Buchan 
included actions such as billing personal expenses to the firm or breaking client confidentiality to benefit to 
the firm. Buchan, supra note at 178–79. The vignettes in the Gibson and Frakes study included situations 
clearly against the Code of Professional Conduct (e.g., a conflict of interest) and situations that could 
possibly be justified under a very liberal interpretation of the Code (e.g., accepting business you were not 
qualified to perform). Gibson & Frakes, supra note 21, at 164–65 & 167. 
32. Nancy Uddin & Peter R. Gillett, The Effects of Moral Reasoning and Self-Monitoring on 
CFO Intentions to Report Fraudulently on Financial Statements, 40 J. of Bus. Ethics 15 (2002). 
33. Tina D. Carpenter & Jane L. Reimers, Unethical and Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 
Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior, 60 J. of Bus. Ethics 115 (2005). 
34. Buchan, supra note 31, at 175; Gibson & Frakes, supra note 21, at 166; Carpenter & 
Reimers, supra note at 34, 125; see also Uddin & Gillett, supra note 32, at 19–20 & 30 (finding that 
attitudes had a greater impact on the intention to commit fraud than did subjective norms for both low and 
high moral reasoners and high and low self-monitors). However, with all the studies on TRA and TPB, 
there are measurement issues, and the possibility that the structure of the questionnaire and the 
questionnaire process itself may influence the relative importance of the determinants. See Shmuel Ellis & 
Shaul Arieli, Predicting Intentions to Report Administrative and Disciplinary Infractions: Applying the 
Reasoned Action Model, 52 Human Relations 947, 962 (1999). 
35. Carpenter & Reimers, supra note 33, at 124.  
36. Id. at 122.  
37. Kurland, Sales Agent, supra note 25; Nancy B. Kurland, Ethical Intentions and the 
Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior, 25 J. of Applied Soc. Psych. 297 (1995) [hereinafter 
Kurland, Ethical Intentions]. 
38. The study involved agents’ intentions to disclose information on sales commission and 
product quality to prospective buyers. Kurland, Sales Agent, supra note 25, at 62.  
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found that moral obligation was the strongest predictor of intentions.39 It is also important 
to note that individual agent characteristics (such as experience level and professional 
accreditation) and commission did not have significant impacts on intentions.40
With respect to whistle blowing, there are two studies testing the TPB. First, 
Randall and Gibson found general support for the TPB,41 including the moral obligation 
determinant.42 Similar to the studies above, they also found that attitude had a stronger 
impact on intent than did subjective norms.43 To help illustrate how the TPB is applied, 
we can take a closer look at the items that make-up the determinants. For example, of the 
items making up the attitude variable used in the study, the outcome measure of 
protecting the safety of patients was independently significant.44 In other words, the real 
potential to improve the health of a patient gave the nurses a positive attitude towards 
whistle blowing. With respect to normative beliefs, the relevant others that were 
independently significant were family members, fellow nurses, and doctors that the nurse 
works with directly.45 The views of top management, supervisory nurses, or the nursing 
professionals in general were not independently significant.46
                                                                                                                                                              
39. Kurland, Ethical Intentions, supra note 37, at 305–306, 309.  She found support for the all 
determinants. Kurland, Sales Agent, supra note 25, at 67. Perceived behavioral control contributed the least 
explanatory power, though the author notes problems with reliability of the perceived behavioral control 
scale she used in the study. Kurland, Ethical Intentions, supra note 37, at 307–308. 
40. Kurland, Sales Agent, supra note 25, at 66–67. However, the design of the study’s 
questionnaire may have influenced those results. Id. at 67n.11. In addition, the organization Kurland studied 
attempted to hire and retain only those sales agents that were not commission-driven. Id. at 68. 
41. Donna M. Randall & Annetta M. Gibson, Ethical Decision Making in the Medical 
Profession: An Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior, 10 J. of Bus. Ethics 111 (1991). 
42. Id. at 117–19. The vignettes used in the study varied whether the scenario indicated that 
the doctor or nurse simply made a mistake or was incompetent and had made many similar mistakes in the 
past. Id. at 114.  The study found that nurses were equally likely to report nurses or doctors, but more likely 
to report errors based on incompetence. Id. at 118. 
43. Id. at 117–18. The perceived control variable was not significant, but there was little 
variation in the variable, making it of limited use in the study. Id. at 118. 
44. Id. at 117–18. 
45. Id. at 117–18.  
46. Id. at 117–18. Other studies, however, have found that supervisor support is positively 
related to whistle blowing intentions, though there is less evidence for a relationship with whistle blowing 
behavior (and it may be a negative relationship). Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam 
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In a second study, Ellis and Arieli47 used the TRA to study officers in the Israeli 
Defense Forces and their intentions to report misconduct by an officer of a higher rank 
than themselves.48 They found a close connection between attitude and subjective norms, 
but overall found that subjective norms were a significantly better predictor of intention 
to report misconduct.49 In addition, it is important to note that other studies, not using the 
TPB, have found evidence that moral obligations (based on role obligations) and attitudes 
influence whistle blowing intentions or behavior.50
B. Summary 
Based on the TPB, if someone is considering taking actions that she knows is 
likely to misrepresent financial information, then her decision will be influenced by: her 
attitude towards the act, the social pressures to engage in the act, her perceived behavioral 
control over being able to successfully complete the act, and her sense of moral 
obligation. The same is true for someone trying to decide if she should report a co-
worker’s or a manager’s fraudulent activity to the company’s ethics hotline, a supervisor, 
or ombudsperson.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing 
Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. of Bus. Ethics 277, 286–87 (2005).  
47. Ellis & Arieli, supra note 34. 
48. Id. at 954. 
49. Id. at 959 and 962.  
50. Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 46, at 285–86 (providing a meta-analytic 
examination of 26 studies on whistle blowing). Evidence of the influence of attitudes and their antecedent 
beliefs included an employee’s approval of whistle blowing and the belief that whistle blowing was in one’s 
best interest. Id. at 285. The ethical climate of the organization—which can capture some of the social 
pressures influencing normative beliefs—was also a consistent predictor of whistle blowing beliefs and 
intentions. Id. at 286–87.  An additional study, not included in the review by Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran, found that the belief that “nothing could be done to remedy the situation” was the main 
reason given by observers of wrongdoing that chose not to report it. Near et al., Does Type of Wrongdoing 
Affect the Whistle-Blowing Process?, 14 Bus. Ethics Q. 219, 238 (2004). This provides further support for 
the importance of the attitude determinant. 
The review of whistle blowing studies by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran challenges the idea 
that intentions to blow the whistle strongly predict actual whistle blowing behavior. Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, supra note 46, at 292; but see Bart Victor et al., Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: The 
Influence of Justice Evaluations and Social Context Factors, 12 J. of Bus. Ethics 253, 257–59 (1993) 
[hereinafter Victor et al., Peer Reporting] (finding that intention to whistle blow was the strongest predictor 
of actual whistle blowing behavior). 
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The studies discussed above provide support for the use of the TPB in predicting 
individuals’ intentions in situations involving organizational fraud and whistle blowing. 
In general, attitudes are a stronger predictor than subjective norms, but that relationship 
changes based on the behavior studied and the variables seem to influence each other. 
There was less support for the perceived behavioral control variable, but that seems to be 
explained either by measurement issues in the research design or by the actors’ beliefs 
that they have complete control over the behavior (e.g., the nurses in the Randall and 
Gibson study may believe that reporting misconduct does not require any special “skills, 
abilities, time, will power, or opportunity.51”) The next section provides a review of the 
empirical evidence on managing ethics in organizations and combines those findings with 
the TPB model to understand how the organization can influence these determinants.  
II. Managing Ethics in Organizations 
A. Corporate Compliance Programs and Ethical Behavior 
The goal of a code of conduct and compliance programs is to ensure that (1) 
employees act lawfully and in ways consistent with the values and rules embodied in the 
code; (2) employees report behavior that is inconsistent with the code; and (3) the 
company takes actions to prevent the non-compliant behavior from occurring again.52 
Although voluntarily adopted compliance programs have almost universal support, critics 
challenge the role they play in corporate criminal law.53 Section 1 reviews the criticism 
that compliance programs are ineffective. Section 2 reviews the empirical studies on 
implementation and finds that there is growing evidence that properly implemented 
                                                                                                                                                              
51. Randall & Gibson, supra note 41, at 119. 
52. See Mark S. Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes of Ethics: Perceptions of Code Users, 
55 J. of Bus. Ethics 323, 325 (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes] (discussing “code 
effectiveness”). 
53. Krawiec Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 14, at 488–89. 
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compliance programs have a positive impact on various behaviors that—as explained by 
the Theory of Planned Behavior in Part B—will lead to less fraud and more whistle 
blowing.  
1. Criticism of Mandatory Compliance Programs 
Because a firm can significantly reduce or even escape liability for having an 
“effective” compliance program, including a code of ethics, under the OSG, compliance 
programs are essentially mandated by the law.54 However, critics complain that there is 
no evidence that ethics codes and compliance programs actually reduce illegal behavior.55 
Support for these arguments comes from empirical studies that find no relationship 
between codes and ethical behavior.56 A recent review of studies on codes of ethics shows 
that approximately half of the studies found that codes were effective in reducing 
unethical behavior, and half did not find a significant relationship.57 Thus, these studies 
do not establish clear support for whether or not codes of ethics directly reduce unethical 
behavior. 
Many of these studies simply look at the presence or absence of a code of ethics 
or compliance program, without attempting to understand how the codes are used by 
employees within the organization.58 With respect to codes of conduct, the view of these 
                                                                                                                                                              
54 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines 31-32 (Oct. 7, 2003) (http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrp.htm) (discussing the 
potential for directors to be in violation of their duty of care if they do not take advantage of the reduced 
penalty possibilities under the OSG by adopting a compliance program). 
55. Id. at 491. 
56. With respect to fraudulent financial reporting, see Arthur P. Brief et al., What’s Wrong 
with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and 
Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. of Bus. Ethics 183, 190–91 (1996) (finding 
that in a laboratory study using a role play exercise that the presence of a code of conduct had no impact on 
the decision to engage in fraudulent financial reporting). 
57. Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes, supra note 52, at 325; see also Mark S. Schwartz, 
The Nature of the Relationship between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behavior, 32 J. of Bus. Ethics 247, 
249–50 (2001) [hereinafter Schwartz, Nature]. (providing a table that reviews the studies on codes of ethics 
published before 2000 based on research methodology and study sample). 
58. See, e.g., Brief et al., supra note 56. 
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researchers and commentators seems to be that the code simply operates as a rule-book 
that employees read and then follow accordingly.59 In practice, however, employees use 
codes in many different ways. For example, an employee may already know that a certain 
action is “wrong” without the information provided in the code, but the code can provide 
support for that employee to resist improper requests from supervisors or co-workers.60 In 
other situations, the code may simply serve to raise general awareness about ethical 
issues in the firm or encourage an employee to seek the advice of others.61 Overall, codes 
of ethics work in both direct and indirect manners to shape employee behavior.62 
Although codes may not directly lead to less illegal behavior, as Schwartz states, “it is 
hard to imagine how ethics could be made an integral part of a company’s business 
practices without at least adopting a code of ethics.”63
Just as critics argue that codes of ethics pushed on firms by the law are simply 
ignored within the firm, critics also argue that compliance programs are simply “window 
dressing” used by organizations to obtain favorable treatment under the OSG but having 
                                                                                                                                                              
59. See, Schwartz, Nature, supra note 57, at 258 (2001). 
60. Id. at 256 (using the metaphor of a “shield” to describe one way that a code may 
influence employee behavior). 
61. Id. at 255–56 (using the metaphors of a “magnifying glass” and a “sign-post” to describe 
ways that a code may influence employee behavior). It may also be the case that codes of ethics serve 
different functions for different types of employees. For example, employees committed to behaving 
ethically may use the code to support their positions, while those employees that do not feel a strong moral 
obligation to behave ethically may be deterred from unethical behavior due to sanctions for violating the 
code. Janet S. Adams et al., Codes of Ethics as Signals for Ethical Behavior, 29 J. of Bus. Ethics 199, 201 
(2001). 
62. In addition to the three metaphors described in notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text, 
Schwartz provides five other metaphors that describe how codes of ethics may influence employee 
behavior in indirect and direct manners. Schwartz, Nature, supra note 57, at 256. His conclusions are based 
on interviews with fifty-seven individuals at four large Canadian companies. Id. at 251. Likewise, in an 
empirical study, Trevino and Weaver measured effectiveness of an ethics program not just by reduced 
unethical behavior, but also by ethics awareness, increased willingness of employees to discuss and seek 
advice on ethical issues, and other indirect influences on behavior. Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, 
Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 
Bus. Ethics Q. 315, 319 (1999). 
63. Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes, supra note 52, at 324. In the NBES survey only 0.4 
percent of employees were in an organization that had a strong ethical culture and no formal program. 
NBES, supra note 1, at 94. This provides some evidence that a formal program helps support the 
development of an ethical culture. Id. at 94. 
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little impact on reducing illegal behavior.64 As with codes of conduct, however, the firm’s 
implementation of the compliance program is significantly more important than simply 
whether or not a firm has adopted one.  
2. The Implementation of Compliance Programs: Compliance-Based versus Integrity-
Based Programs 
Starting with Lynn Sharp Paine’s 1994 article Managing for Organizational 
Integrity, management researchers regularly distinguish between compliance-based 
programs and integrity-based programs. 65 A firm using a compliance-based program 
focuses its efforts on deterrence through threat of detection and punishment for violations 
of the law or code of conduct.66 A firm using an integrity-based approach, on the other 
hand, focuses its efforts on establishing legitimacy with employees through internally 
developed organizational values and self-governance.67 For example, whereas a 
compliance-based program focuses on teaching employees the laws and rules they must 
comply with, an integrity-based program focuses on integrating ethics into employees’ 
decision making and inspiring them to live up the company’s ethical ideals.68  
With an integrity-based program, obeying the law “is viewed as a positive aspect 
of organizational life, rather than an unwelcome constraint imposed by external 
                                                                                                                                                              
64. Krawiec Cosmetic Compliance, supra note 14, at 491–92. For an empirical study 
supporting this claim, see Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: 
Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. of Bus. Ethics 367, 375–76 (2002) 
(finding that compliance programs consistent with the organizational sentencing guidelines had no impact 
on the incidence of OSHA violations). For an empirical study on the effectiveness of codes of conduct at 
reducing white collar crime, see Karen Schnatterly, Increasing Firm Value Through Detection and 
Prevention of White Collar Crime, 24 Strategic Mgmt J. 587, 590, 603 (2003) (finding that a “stronger 
and more complex” code of conduct reduces white collar crime). 
65. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, Harvard Bus. Rev., 
March/April 1994, at 106, 110–111. 
66. Id. at 110. 
67. Id. at 111; Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing 
Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 21, 32–33 (2001) (stating that employees can be 
motivated to comply with codes of ethics by either enforcement mechanisms (i.e., fear of consequences for 
non-compliance) or engendering mechanisms (i.e., internalization of the code)). 
68. Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 317–18; Paine, supra note 65, at 113. 
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authorities.”69 This is consistent with research pioneered by Tom Tyler which shows that 
obedience to the law is based on a sense of moral obligation to legitimate laws, rather 
than solely on threats of punishment.70 In general, an integrity-based program is focused 
on creating a corporate culture where employees feel comfortable discussing ethical 
issues, they are rewarded for responsible behavior, and leadership demonstrates its 
commitment to ethics by personally living up to the company’s standards and 
incorporating those values into strategic decisions.71
Although Paine based her original article on just a handful of case studies, 
subsequent research has confirmed that an integrity-based program is more effective than 
a compliance-based program in reaching positive outcomes for the firm. For example, 
Weaver and Trevino72 found that all compliance programs had a positive impact on 
employees’ awareness of ethical issues, willingness to seek advice, decision-making, and 
reduced observed unethical behavior.73 The perception by employees that a compliance 
program was integrity-based, however, was a stronger predictor of those outcomes74 and 
also was associated with employees’ willingness to report misconduct,75 employee 
commitment to the firm, the belief that it is acceptable to submit “bad news” to 
management, and the belief that you can live by your personal values at work.76 
Likewise, a separate study found that a compliance-oriented program had positive results 
                                                                                                                                                              
69. Paine, supra note 65, at 111. 
70. Paine, supra note 65, at 111. See also, Brien, supra note 67, at 25–26 (comparing codes of 
ethics to laws and stressing the importance of legitimacy and consent of the governed). 
71. Paine, supra note 65, at 112. 
72. Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 326 
73. Id. at 328. 
74. Id. at 329–30. 
75. This finding was further found to require both a compliance and integrity-based 
approach. Id. at 328. 
76. Id. at 325 and 328 
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with respect to similar outcomes, but that an integrity-based program was more effective 
in bringing about those results.77  
Compliance-based programs and integrity-based programs are not mutually 
exclusive. Recent research suggests that a successful program will have elements of 
each.78 A key factor is to find the right balance and not to overemphasize the compliance 
aspect.79 There is, however, a third way to implement a compliance program, which is 
simply to protect top management from liability. That is a program that employees 
believe management implemented for the sole purpose of supporting a claim that any 
misconduct was caused by a rogue employee violating the company’s rules and best 
efforts to control misconduct.80 In those situations, compliance programs are ineffective, 
and potentially counterproductive, in achieving positive outcomes and positive intentions 
toward ethical behavior.81
                                                                                                                                                              
77. Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and 
What Hurts, 41 Calif. Mgmt. Rev. 131, 138–39 (1999) [hereinafter Trevino et al, What Hurts].  The 
authors based their study on the following specific outcomes: observed unethical/illegal behavior, 
awareness of ethical/legal issues, seeking advice, delivering bad news to management, reporting violations, 
improved decision making, and commitment to the organization.  Id. at 132–35. 
78. Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 330. See also, Brien, supra note 67, at 34–35 
(arguing that failing to use enforcement mechanisms makes a compliance program “not credible,” but 
solely using such mechanisms “fails to foster organizational virtue” and “is, ultimately, self-defeating.”).   
79. Paine, supra note 65, at 111. See also Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 330 (stating 
“when a values orientation is strong, compliance activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of 
support for ethical behavior. Without a strong values orientation, however, compliance activities may be 
perceived to be part of a system aimed only at detecting misconduct.”); Brien supra note 67, at 38 (arguing 
that enforcement should only be used against those “who cannot be reformed through engendering 
programs alone” and the enforcement mechanisms (e.g., surveillance) should only be targeted at “known 
weak spots and reported problem areas”) and 39–41 (comparing enforcement of ethics codes to Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s regulatory enforcement pyramid). For a more general discussion of trying to find the right 
balance between rule-based compliance and more aspirational, ethics-based approaches, see Hess et al., 
The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic 
Integration of Business Ethics, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 725, 746–57 (2006) (providing a 
discussion of three distinct, but related, ways of building trust in organizations). 
80. Trevino et al., supra note 77, at 138. 
81. Id. at 136–37. (finding, for example, that employees are less comfortable delivering bad 
news or seeking advice on ethical issues when they perceive that the compliance program is designed only 
to protect management). 
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Additional support for the above findings comes from surveys conducted by 
KPMG82 and the Ethics Resource Center.83 KPMG’s survey found significant differences 
between firms that implemented a compliance program consistent with an “effective” 
program under the OSG and firms that had a compliance program without all of the 
elements of an effective program.84 The differences—reported in Table 1—show 
significantly more positive behavioral beliefs towards ethical behavior in organizations 
with complete compliance programs. As discussed more fully below, according to the 
TPB, these beliefs should translate into reduced fraudulent behavior and increased 
whistle blowing behavior. 
Table 185















Senior executives sets an 
appropriate “tone at the 
top” 
84% 29% 
Senior executives value 
integrity over short-term 
goals 
82% 28% 
People feel motivated and 
empowered to “do the right 
thing” 
90% 51% 
People feel comfortable 
raising ethics concerns 
85% 36% 
People apply the right 
values to their decisions 
90% 53% 
                                                                                                                                                              
82. KPMG conducted their survey between November 2004 and March 2005. KPMG 
Forensic, supra note 3, at 23. They mailed out 6,797 surveys and received 4,056 responses from people 
employed by firms of various sizes and in a wide range of industries. Id. at 23–26. 
83. NBES, supra note 1. 
84. KPMG Forensic, supra note 3, at 13–14 (2006) (available online at 
http://www.404institute.com/). The KPMG study does not specifically mention the OSG. Also, the study 
does not provide information on whether or not there are other significant differences between the two 
groups of firms that may affect the employees’ responses (e.g., company size, industry).  
85. Source: KPMG, supra note 3, at 14–19. 
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There is minimal 
willingness to tolerate 
misconduct 
84% 35% 
There is minimal 
opportunity to engage in 
misconduct 
80% 30% 
Rewards are based on 
ends, not the means to 
achieve the ends 
41% 57% 
Would you feel 
comfortable reporting 
misconduct to a supervisor 
88% 48% 
If you reported 
misconduct, do you believe 
you would be satisfied 
with the outcome 
68% 22% 
 
Similar to KPMG’s survey, The Ethics Resource Center’s National Business 
Ethics Survey (NBES) compiled information on firms’ compliance programs,86 but it also 
went further and looked at the organizations’ cultures. The NBES measured culture by 
surveying respondents on the presence of “ethics related actions” within an organization. 
Ethics related actions measure respondents’ beliefs that fellow employees, supervisors, 
and management are willing to discuss ethical issues, support responsible conduct, serve 
as good examples of ethical conduct, and engage in other similar actions.87 Overall, they 
found that culture has a greater impact than a formal program on outcomes such as 
observed misconduct, reporting of misconduct, and perceived ability to handle 
                                                                                                                                                              
86. The NBES identified six key elements of a formal compliance program based on the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. Those elements are: (1) written standards; (2) ethics training; (3) 
mechanisms to provide employees with desired ethics advice or information; (4) anonymous reporting of 
misconduct; (5) discipline for those violating company standards; and (6) including ethical conduct in 
performance reviews. NBES, supra note 1, at 47. 
87. Id. at 61. 
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misconduct if faced with such a situation.88 In addition, the NBES showed that the 
presence of a formal program had a greater impact in organizations with a weak ethical 
culture.89
B. Organizational Ethics and the Theory of Planned Behavior 
Given this general understanding of the importance of implementation, we can 
now take a closer look at the potential impact of compliance programs on the beliefs that 
form employees’ intentions on ethical behavior under the TPB. These sections examine 
each determinant of intentions—attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral 
control, and moral obligations—in turn. It should be noted that these determinants 
influence each other and factors listed under one determinant may also affect other 
determinants. For example, subjective norms can influence intentions directly, or they can 
influence the beliefs that form an individual’s attitude.90  After reviewing the available 
research on each individual determinant, section 5 summarizes how compliance programs 
improve employees’ intentions, encouraging ethical behavior.   
1. Improving Attitudes 
As discussed earlier, a person’s attitude towards a behavior depends on his or her 
beliefs about what outcomes will follow from an action (behavioral beliefs) and the 
actor’s evaluation of those outcomes as good or bad (outcome evaluations). If an 
employee does not expect that an action will create the desired result, then the employee 
will have a negative attitude toward the behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that when 
witnesses of misconduct are asked why they did not report the wrongdoing, they 
                                                                                                                                                              
88. Id. at 79. 
89. Id. at 79. 
90. Vallerand et al., Ajzen and Fishbein’s Theory of Reason Action as Applied to Moral 
Behavior: A Confirmatory Analysis, 62 J. of Personality and Soc. Psych. 98, 108 (1992). 
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commonly respond that they did not think anything would be done (or could be done) to 
fix the problem.91  
In the National Business Ethics Survey, forty-five percent of respondents that had 
witnessed some type of misconduct chose not to report it.92 The most common reason 
respondents gave for not reporting was the belief that no corrective action would be 
taken.93 Fifty-nine percent of respondents selected this as an important factor in their 
decision.94 By contrast, those that indicated that they reported misconduct believed it was 
the right thing to do (99.5 percent), but they also believed that corrective action would be 
taken (79 percent).95 In addition to not believing the behavior would produce a desired 
outcome, non-reporting respondents had a negative attitude towards whistle blowing due 
to their fear of retaliation (46 percent) and a belief that retaliation could happen because 
they doubted that their reporting really would be anonymous (39 percent).96
Although potential whistle blowers may have negative attitudes due to a fear of 
retaliation, others may have a negative attitude towards doing “the right thing” due to a 
fear of withheld rewards. The most likely sources for rewards are through performance 
reviews, incentive compensation systems, and promotions. Employees are more likely to 
develop a positive attitude towards behavior that the organization rewards, even if it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
91. Near et al., supra note 50, at 238 (finding that “nothing could be done to remedy the 
situation” was the main reason given by observers of wrongdoing that chose not to report it). 
92. NBES, supra note 1, at 28. Twenty-six percent of respondents stated that they had 
witnessed some form of “misconduct.” Id. at 16. This number rises to 52 percent when the respondents are 
provided with a list of examples of misconduct to choose from, as opposed to simply being asked about 
“misconduct” generally. Id. at. 16–17. 
93. Id. at 29.  
94. Id.
95. Id. at 28. The other factors selected by respondents included the belief that they had the 
support of management (75 percent) or co-workers (75 percent); that they could report the incident 
anonymously (63 percent); and that no one else would or could report the incident (49 percent). Id. The 
percentages exceed 100 percent because respondents were asked to select all factors that apply. Id.
96. Id. at 29. The other factors selected by respondents included the belief that someone else 




unethical behavior.97  If the incentive plan only recognizes the employee’s end numbers, 
then the employee will be punished to the extent that lower numbers are the result of 
following the rules. On the other hand, if an employee believes that she is being rewarded 
for the means of achieving a result, and not just the ends, she will have a more positive 
attitude towards following the company’s code of conduct and her own ethical values. An 
organization does not necessarily have to reward ethical behavior to improve attitudes, 
but it assures an employee that she will not be punished for behaving ethically.98 Through 
their own experience and the observation of the treatment of others, employees gain 
evidence that they are not “suckers” for following the rules while others that do not are 
able to achieve superior outcomes.99
In addition to the strong impact of reward systems, many argue that the business 
environment in general can cause individuals to behave less ethically than they otherwise 
would.100 For example, one study found that changing the name of a social dilemma 
game from the “community game” to the “Wall Street Game” cut cooperative behaviors 
in half.101 In this study, the framing of the problem likely influenced the basis of players’ 
outcome evaluations which in turn shaped their attitudes toward cooperation. Thus, 
negative attitudes toward cooperative behavior are always lurking in the background and 
must be proactively managed by the firm. That is, if defection is the default in business 
                                                                                                                                                              
97. Carpenter & Reimers, supra note 33, at 118. For example, in their study, Carpenter and 
Reimers were able to manipulate the attitude variable by changing what behaviors they told subjects that 
management encouraged. Id. at 122–24. 
98. See Adams et al., supra note 61, at 207. 
99. Victor et al., Peer Reporting, supra note 50, at 262. 
100. Adams et al., supra note 61, at 208. 
101. Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific 
Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1099–1100 (2003). In social dilemma 
games actors have individual incentives not to cooperate with the group (to defect), but when they do so, 
the collective outcome is suboptimal. In other words, those that do not cooperate are free-riding on the 
efforts of those that do.  
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organizations, then managers must take affirmative steps to change the framing of the 
problem and the structuring of rewards to engender positive attitudes. 
2. Changing Social Pressures 
The famous Asch studies dramatically illustrate the role of social pressures on 
organizational decision-making. In these experiments, subjects were asked to complete a 
simple line length matching exercise, which they could do easily when alone.102 
However, when the subjects attempted to complete the exercise in a room with others that 
were all giving the same incorrect answer, the subjects consistently gave into social 
pressures and also selected the wrong line more than one-third of the time.103 Thus, even 
when the subjects are sure they know the correct response, social pressures can create 
uncertainties about previous beliefs and even change behaviors.  
In large business organizations, the pressures to conform and the uncertainty 
surrounding any decision can be significantly greater than in Asch’s studies. 
Inexperienced managers must rely on local norms for guidance in periods of 
uncertainty,104 which can lead to the continuation of wrongful activity. As one employee 
in a risk-management position at Enron stated:  
If your boss was [fudging], and you have never worked 
anywhere else, you just assume that everybody fudges 
earnings. . . . Once you get there and you realized how it 
was, do you stand up and lose your job? It was scary. It was 
easy to get into ‘Well, everybody else is doing it, so maybe 
it isn’t so bad.’105  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
102. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About The Social Animal 
13, 16 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995). When completing the exercise alone, subjects gave the correct answer 99 
percent of the time. Id.
103. Id.
104. For example, in situations of lying to customers or blowing the whistle to avoid physical 
harm to others, important referent others such as family members should strongly influence subjective 
norms. However, in situations involving complicated organizational issues with unclear standards of 
behavior, normative beliefs are likely to be strongly shaped by those you most closely work with. 
105. John A. Byrne, The Environment was Ripe for Abuse, Bus. Wk., Feb. 25, 2002, at 118.  
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In the Enron case, as in the Asch studies, the individual’s thought that the act was wrong 
was overridden by social pressures to conform to local norms of behavior.  
In other situations, a clear norm on behavior may not yet have emerged. For 
example, in Ellis and Arieli’s study of whistle blowing in the military, the authors found 
that there was not a clear organizational norm of reporting misconduct among the 
officers.106 Thus, when the officers faced a whistle blowing decision, they looked to 
others for guidance, which led to subjective norms having greater influence than attitudes 
on intentions.107 In these situations, a norm of unethical behavior has the chance to 
develop and spread through social pressures until it becomes the unquestioned standard.  
To reduce such potentially negative social influences, the specific content of the 
code of conduct should help reduce the uncertainty surrounding the rules and values that 
guide employees. However, the social norms of the organization will still have significant 
influence on how the code is actually used in the organization. For example, Adam and 
Rachman-Moore found that employees believed that the social norms of the organization 
were significantly more important for influencing their commitment to the organization’s 
values and rules than training programs.108 These norms teach employees how the code of 
ethics actually works in practice and what are the true values of the firm. 
Social pressures can also have a positive influence on ethical behavior. One way 
the firm can manage these social pressures is through codes of ethics. For example, a 
study by Adams and colleagues found that employees in firms with ethics codes viewed 
                                                                                                                                                              
106. Ellis & Arieli, supra note 34, at 962. 
107. Id. at 962–63. 
108. Avshalom M. Adam & Dalia Rachman-Moore, The Methods Used to Implement an 
Ethical Code of Conduct and Employee Attitudes, 54 J. of Bus. Ethics 225, 235 (2004). This is not to say, 
however, that formal training programs are unimportant, as the authors discovered in their more in-depth 
interviews with employees of the organization they studied. Id. at 238–40. 
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their fellow organizational members as being more ethical,109 viewed the company as 
more supportive of ethical behavior, and were less likely to believe that they faced 
pressure to behave unethically.110 This was true even though most employees could not 
recall the contents of their company’s code of ethics.111 In addition, the code had a 
positive impact on attitudes by making it more likely for an employee to believe that they 
would be satisfied with the outcome of an ethical dilemma they faced.112 These results are 
consistent with the results of the KPMG survey reported in Table 1. Note, for example, 
that 84 percent of employees in companies with a complete compliance program stated 
that misconduct was not tolerated by others in the workplace, compared to just 35 percent 
of employees with a less complete code.113
3. Control Systems and Control Beliefs 
Perceived behavioral control involves both internal and external factors. Internal 
factors include an employee’s belief in their level of competence to carry out (or refuse 
requests to carry out) fraudulent activity or courage to report observed misconduct to 
management. External factors relate to the obstacles in the actor’s way. For example, 
knowing that auditors will review your financial statements should reduce your belief that 
you could successfully falsify documents.  
Although audits are perhaps the most well-known control, they are of course not 
foolproof, and they do not always significantly reduce an employee’s perceived 
                                                                                                                                                              
109. Adams et al., supra note 61, at 204 & 206. This includes top management, supervisors, 
peers, and subordinates. Id.
110. Id. at 204 & 206. 
111. Id. at 208 
112. Id. at 204 & 206. 
113. KPMG, supra note 3, at 19. 
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behavioral control. 114  In addition, simply increasing the aggressiveness of existing audits 
may do little to improve their deterrent effect.115
More aggressive monitoring in general is also more problematic than many 
believe. Langevoort, for example, identifies several behavioral tendencies that frustrate 
effective monitoring by supervisors116 and argues that third-party auditing is less effective 
and significantly more costly than most people realize.117 Monitoring with improperly 
designed sanctions may also be counterproductive. For example, Tenbrunsel and Messick 
found that the presence of a monitoring system with sanctions for non-compliance caused 
employees to view a social dilemma as a business decision (i.e., in terms of expected 
payoffs) rather than as a problem involving ethical issues to be resolved.118 Then, when 
the penalties for misconduct were too low or there was little likelihood of detection, there 
was more wrongful behavior than when there was no sanctioning system in place.119 
Excessive monitoring can also reduce trust, or displace intrinsic motivations (moral 
obligations under the TPB) with extrinsic motivations (decision-making based on self-
                                                                                                                                                              
114. See Arnold Schneider & Neil Wilner, A test of audit deterrent to financial reporting 
irregularities using the randomized response technique, 65 Accounting Rev. 668, 679–80 (1990). The 
authors found support for the deterrent effect of having either an internal or external audit—which suggests 
employees perceived less control—but the deterrent effect only applied in situations where the employee 
had limited financial incentives to engage in fraud and the fraud was of a type that was expected to gain 
auditor attention (e.g., a material misstatement involving a clear and obvious violation of GAAP). Id. at 
670–71, 679–80. 
115. Wilfred C. Uecker et al., Perception of the internal and external auditor as a deterrent to 
corporate irregularities, 56 Accounting Rev. 465, 477–78 (1981) (finding that an increase in perceived 
aggressiveness of internal or external auditing had no additional deterrent effect on the decision to 
materially overstate net income).  
116. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance 
with Law, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 71, 85–90 (2002). 
117. Langevoort, supra note 116, at 93–100; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Appeal and Limits of 
Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. Corp. L. 267, 270 (2004). (summarizing his 
conclusions by stating: “auditors know controls and audits are inherently limited processes, while lawyers 
invest more confidence that these processes can assure substantive results. The resulting expectations gap 
adds pressure to use more controls and audits that simultaneously promote the appearance of control and 
reduce actual control.”).   
118. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and 
Cooperation, 44 Admin. Sci. Q. 684, 685 (1999). 
119. Id. at 695–96. 
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interested cost-benefit analyses).120 Thus, not only is a control system both costly and less 
effective than many people expect, but it may also have a negative effect on the other 
determinants of intentions to act ethically under the TPB. 
A corporation’s culture can also have a significant impact on employees’ 
perceived behavioral control. Many employees face strong pressures from leadership to 
engage in unethical behavior121 and even though they have a negative attitude towards the 
behavior they feel that they have no other alternative but to obey. 122  This is illustrated by 
the well-known Milgram experiments, where subjects gave what they believed to be life-
threatening electric shocks to other study participants because an authority figure ordered 
them to do so.123 Research in accounting and auditing has empirically verified the ability 
of authority figures to use obedience pressure to force subordinates to violate professional 
standards.124 Although the Milgram experiments may be interpreted as removing actors 
from the TPB, as they are simply submitting to legitimate authority and not acting upon 
                                                                                                                                                              
120. See Langevoort, supra note 116, at 96–99; see generally Bruno S. Frey, Not Just For 
the Money (1997) (discussing the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations and their impact 
on personal motivation); but see Angela L. Coletti, The Effect of Control Systems on Trust and Cooperation 
in Collaborative Environments, 80 Accounting Rev. 477 (2005) (finding that control systems can improve 
trust). 
121. NBES found that ten percent of employees felt pressure to violate the law or their 
companies’ standards. NBES, supra note 1, at 41. Of those, 20 percent indicated that they feel such pressure 
“all the time” and another 24 percent indicated “fairly often.” Id. The source of those pressures was 
primarily top management (indicated by 36 percent of respondents) and middle management (39%). Id. at 
43. 
122. See Kurland, Ethical Intentions, supra note 37, at 308. 
123. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (2004 Classics edition). In the Milgram 
experiments, subjects were ordered to give a “learner” increasingly greater shocks each time the learner 
gave a wrong answer. Even as the learner pounded on the wall in protest (the learner was not visible to the 
subject in the original experiment) and eventually fell silent with the higher voltage shocks, the subjects 
continued to shock the learner on the experimenter’s orders, with 65% of the subjects administering the 
highest possible shock (labeled as “XXX”). Milgram at 32–35. 
124. See Davis et al., The Effect of Obedience Pressure and Perceived Responsibility on 
Management Accountants’ Creation of Budgetary Slack, 18 Behavioral Research in Accounting 19 
(2006); DeZoort et al., An investigation of obedience pressure effects on auditors’ judgments, 6 Behavioral 
Research in Accounting 1 (1994). 
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their intentions,125 for our purposes, the basic lessons are clearly relevant. Many 
organizations have a corporate culture that emulates the Milgram experiment by seeking 
to reinforce and strengthen hierarchal control by expecting employees to simply “do what 
they are told” and not consider other alternatives.126  Not surprisingly, employees in 
corporations with such cultures observe more unethical behavior, and they are less 
willing to discuss ethical issues, deliver bad news to supervisors, or report violations.127  
4. Managing Moral Obligations 
An individual’s sense of moral obligations to follow the company’s code of 
conduct clearly depends upon individual differences in ethical values, but it also depends 
upon factors within the organization’s control.128  Procedural justice within the 
organization is a primary way that firms can foster positive moral obligations towards its 
rules. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the implementation of a company’s 
policies and procedures both formally and informally.129  
                                                                                                                                                              
125. Milgram, supra note 123, at 132–43; DeZoort et al., supra note 124, at 7–8; David M. 
Messick & Rafal K. Ohme, Ethical Aspects of Social Psychology, in Power and Influence in 
Organizations 197 (Roderick M. Kramer and Margaret A. Neale, eds., 1998). 
126. Trevino et al., The Ethical Context in Organizations: Influences on Employee Attitudes 
and Behaviors, 8 Bus. Ethics Q. 447, 460 (1998) [hereinafter Trevino et al., Ethical Context]. An illustrative 
example of such pressures in large organizations comes from KPMG’s process of convincing partners to 
develop and sell “aggressive” (and potentially illegal) tax shelters. Lynnley Browning, How an Accounting 
Firm Went From Resistance to Resignation, N.Y. Times, August 28, 2005, at A1. The person that would 
later become Chief Financial Officer of KPMG regularly sent out emails stating “you will do this now” in 
large, red font. Id. Another senior officer responded to tax partners’ questions on the appropriateness of a 
strategy by stating you’re “either on the team or off the team.” Id. Eventually, sixteen tax partners were 
charged with criminal offenses, including the author of those emails and the person quoted above. Andrew 
Parker, 10 more charged in KPMG tax fraud case, Fin. Times, October 18, 2005, at 30; Lynnley Browning, 
Defendants File a Flurry of Motions Challenging the KPMG Tax-Shelter Case, N.Y. Times, January 13, 
2006, at C3. 
127. Trevino et al., Ethical Context, supra note 126, at 469; Trevino et al, What Hurts, supra 
note 77, at 136–37, 143–44. 
128. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work 
Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1287, 1290 (2005). 
129. Daniel P. Skarlicki & Robert Folger, Retaliation in the Workplace: The Roles of 
Distributive, Procedural and Interactional Justice, 82 J. of Applied Psych. 434, 435 (1997); Victor et al., 
Peer Reporting, supra note 50, at 254. Employees’ perceptions of procedural justice depend on (1) the 
quality of the organization’s decision making procedures (e.g., use of objective evidence), (2) the quality of 
the organization’s treatment of people (e.g., respecting individual’s rights), (3) the company’s formal rules 
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Tom Tyler, the leading scholar on procedural justice in organizations, states that 
organizations can seek compliance with their rules either through a command-and-control 
approach focused on monitoring, deterrence, and punishment (consistent with the 
compliance-based approach discussed earlier) or a self-regulatory approach focused on an 
employee’s internal motivations and ethical values (consistent with the integrity-based 
approach).130 Tyler finds that the self-regulatory approach is more effective in gaining 
employee rule-following than a command-and-control approach.131 To gain the benefits 
of a self-regulatory approach, the organization can enhance the legitimacy of the rules 
through a fair process of application and as a result influence an employee’s moral 
obligation to follow the rules.132 Thus, if upper management acts in a manner which 
shows that the company’s code of ethics does not apply to them, then employees will 
recognize the unfairness and feel no obligation to follow the company’s rules.133 The 
organization can also improve self-regulation by encouraging employees to act upon their 
values, which creates congruence between the company’s rules and employee values.134 
The perception of congruence between employee and company values is also influenced 
by procedural justice.135  
                                                                                                                                                              
and values statements, and (4) the application of the rules and the general treatment of the employee by the 
local supervisor. Tyler, supra note 128, at 1309–1311. Procedural justice, as defined by these four 
components, is distinct from the employee’s perceptions of the fairness of the outcomes of the process. Id. 
at 1311. 
130. Tyler, supra note 128, at 1289–91; Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Bladder, Can Businesses 
Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 Acad. 
Mgmt. J. 1143, 1143–45 (2005). 
131. Tyler & Bladder, supra note 130, at 1148 & 1153. 
132. See Id. at 1154.  
133. Tyler, supra note 126, at 1307; see also Langevoort, supra note 116, at 108–109 (noting 
that if employees perceive that management itself is not following the values embodied in the code of 
ethics, then employees will view the compliance program as unfair and have a lowered desire to comply). 
Employees may also respond to unfair treatment with retaliation against the employer as a way to punish 
the firm for unfair treatment. See generally Skarlicki & Folger, supra. 
134. Id. at 1153–54. 
135. Tyler, supra note 126, at 1305–1306. Tyler states that “fair organizational procedures and 
processes are hypothesized to foster a sense that corporate authorities are legitimate and that the 
organization itself possesses moral values similar to those of the individual.” Id. at 1306. 
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Organizations have also been successful in positively influencing intentions and 
behaviors by changing employees’ role requirements. Studies by Victor and Trevino 
found that employees felt a personal obligation to report peers when the code of conduct 
or their specific job required this behavior.136 Simply changing role requirements is likely 
not sufficient, however, as employees still must accept that responsibility.137  
5. Integrity-Based Programs and the TPB 
This empirical evidence on determinants provides support for the claim that 
compliance programs consistent with the OSG, and most importantly integrity-based 
programs, can improve employees’ intentions that lead to ethical behavior. First, 
integrity-based programs improve attitudes by creating the perception of more positive 
outcomes from ethical behavior. The presence of a compliance program helps potential 
whistle blowers believe that that they will be satisfied with the consequences of 
reporting.138 Employees also will be more likely to believe that the company’s reward 
system will not punish them for doing the right thing.139 Integrity-based programs also 
influence attitudes by encouraging employees’ to judge outcomes based on their own 
values (leading to increased compliance with a code of ethics) rather than direct them 
towards focusing only on their own individual payoffs.140  
                                                                                                                                                              
136. Victor et al., Peer Reporting, supra note 50, at 259–260 (finding that role responsibility 
influenced intentions to report misconduct, which in turn influenced actual reporting behaviors); Linda 
Klebe Trevino & Bart Victor, Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: A Social Context Perspective, 35 
Acad. of Mgmt. J. 38, 60 (1992) (finding that role responsibility influenced intentions to report 
misconduct, but the test design did not include actual reporting behavior). 
137. Trevino & Victor, supra note 136, at 60–61. 
138. See Table 1. Effective compliance programs had this impact on firms regardless of their 
corporate culture. NBES, supra note 1, at 82–83.   
139. See Table 1 (reporting survey findings that with a complete compliance program, 
employees are less likely to believe that rewards are only based on ends and more likely to believe that 
executives value integrity over short-term goals). 
140. See notes 100–101 and accompanying text (discussing how the business environment can 
shape an employees’ framing of outcome evaluations); see notes 130–135 and accompanying text 
(discussing Tyler’s work on procedural justice and self-regulation); Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 
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Second, compliance programs influence subjective norms by reducing social 
pressure for unethical behavior141 and creating an environment where employees feel free 
to discuss ethical issues and seek advice.142 By opening up communications on ethical 
issues within the organization, employees are able to actively voice their opinions, and 
more responsible norms of behavior emerge. 143 Employees are also more likely to seek 
out expert advice that will give them clear answers to their ethical dilemmas, as opposed 
to the alternative of following the crowd in the face of uncertainty. In support of this, the 
NBES found that in organizations where co-workers talk about ethics and support 
organizational standards,144 employees at all levels of the firm observe less misconduct 
and are less likely to be exposed to situations involving misconduct.145
Third, integrity-based programs enhance an employee’s perceived behavioral 
control to refuse to engage in fraud and to report observed misconduct. The NBES survey 
found that employees in a corporation with ethics training or a strong corporate culture 
believed they were prepared to handle any problems they may face.146  Through training, 
they felt they had the skills and resources necessary to follow through with their 
intentions. Likewise, a study involving Chief Financial Officers found that training on 
                                                                                                                                                              
329–30 (finding that an integrity-based program creates the perception that you can act on your own values 
at work). 
141. See notes 109–111 and accompanying text (citing evidence that compliance programs 
create the perception that the organization supports the values in the code of ethics). In addition, integrity-
based programs create the perception that management and co-workers are supportive of ethical behavior. 
142. See Table 1; Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 329–30. 
143. See generally Scott Sonenshein, Business Ethics and Internal Social Criticism, 15 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 475 (2005) (developing a theoretical model of internal social criticism). 
144. These are some of the factors that the NBES refers to as “ethics related actions” or ERAs. 
NBES, supra note 1, at 60. ERAs, along with the extent to which employees believe members of their 
organization are held accountable for their actions, make up the index the NBES uses to classify a firm as 
having an ethical culture. Id. at 74, 76. 
145. Id. at 89–92. 
146. Id. at 88 (finding that 83% of employees in firms with ethics training felt well prepared to 
handle risk situations, compared to 66% of employees in firms without training). Employees at all levels of 
the firm with a stronger corporate culture felt more prepared to handle situations potentially involving 
misconduct. Id. at 89–92. 
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their company’s code of ethics made it more likely that they used the code in strategic 
decisions because the training provided them with a higher level of perceived behavior 
control over its use.147  
Fourth, integrity-based programs cause employees to feel empowered to act upon 
their own values and moral obligations. 148 The employee feels in control, as the company 
will not discourage them from acting on their moral beliefs. And, as shown by Tyler’s 
work, this increases an employee’s moral obligation to follow company rules.149
It is, of course, important to note that there are limitations to all of the empirical 
studies reported here. Other evidence is based on surveys conducted by non-profit 
organizations and accounting firms that also have significant limits, such as not 
controlling for other potential influencing variables.150 Nonetheless the empirical 
evidence does strongly point in the same direction and, at a minimum, encourages 
additional research in this area. 
III. Legislating Ethics in Organizations: Small Steps toward Reducing Fraudulent 
Behavior 
Based on the analysis above, there is strong evidence to believe that properly 
implemented compliance programs can improve ethical behavior in organizations and 
reduce the high levels of fraud that currently exist. The conclusion by some 
commentators that compliance programs are a failure is premature; we are still a long 
way from having firms implement “effective” compliance programs. Consider for 
                                                                                                                                                              
147. John M. Stevens et al., Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics 
Codes on Financial Executives’ Decisions, 26 Strategic Mgmt. J. 181, 185 (2005) 
148. Weaver & Trevino, supra note 62, at 329–30. 
149. See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text. 
150. For a discussion of the research methodology challenges when studying ethical behavior, 
see generally Donna M. Randall & Maria F. Fernandes, The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics 
Research, 10 J. Bus. Ethics 805 (1991); Michael J. O’Fallon & Kenneth D. Butterfield, A Review of the 
Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 1996–2003, 59 J. of Bus. Ethics 375, 403–405 (2005). 
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example that the NBES found that only 41 percent of firms with over 10,000 employees 
(and 26 percent overall) had implemented all of the elements of an effective program 
under the OSG.151 In addition, only 22 percent of the organizations in their study had both 
all of the elements of an effective compliance program and an ethical corporate culture 
based on the study’s criteria.152  
The analysis in this section focuses on the smaller steps that can be taken to 
improve the current system of compliance programs under Sarbanes Oxley and the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. I do not address questions of whether there should 
be a radical change in corporate criminal liability153 or whether Sarbanes Oxley should be 
repealed or drastically reformed. I also do not address larger issues that would also have a 
significant (but indirect) impact on ethics in corporations, such as returning corporations 
to a focus on long-term value154 or reforming executive compensation.155 Instead, the 
challenge I consider in this section is the role of the law in pushing firms to adopt 
“effective” compliance programs.  
A. Why Don’t Firms Adopt Integrity-Based Compliance Programs? 
To understand why firms are not implementing integrity-based corporate 
compliance programs, we can place top management into two categories: (1) those that 
seek an effective compliance program but have priorities elsewhere that prevent effective 
                                                                                                                                                              
151. NBES, supra note 1, at 56.  
152. NBES, supra note 1, at 94. 
153. See Laufer supra note 15. 
154. See Dean Krehmeyer & Matthew Orsagh, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle (2006) 
(available online at: www.corporate-ethics.org/pdf/Short-termism_Report.pdf) (providing recommendations 
for what CEOs, asset managers, investors, and analysts need to do to break out of the cycle of focusing 
only on short-term gains); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export 
(2001) (providing policy recommendations for how to refocus managers on long-term growth). 
155. See John C. Bogle, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism 25–26 (2005) (stating that 
excess executive compensation goes hand-in-hand with pressures for managed earning in the firm); see 
generally Symposium on Bebchuk & Fried’s Pay Without Performance, 30 J. of Corp. Law (2005) 
(providing various perspectives on the problems of executive compensation and potential reforms). 
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adoption; and (2) those that adopt compliance programs simply as a form of “insurance” 
and therefore are uninterested in fully implementing the program beyond features easily 
observed by outsiders. We can refer to the first category as the misguided executives and 
the second category as the misleading executives. 
The misguided executive believes, correctly, that internal controls are a useful 
deterrent to fraud. However, they are also likely to believe that the solution to any 
problem is simply more controls. In general, managers have a bias towards adopting 
compliance-based programs focused on sanctions,156 which causes them to find little 
value in other mechanisms such as anonymous reporting hotlines and ethics training.157  
Likewise, prosecutors and judges reviewing programs are also likely have a bias towards 
more controls,158 which will influence how managers implement their programs. With 
limited time and resources to devote to their compliance programs, it is reasonable to 
expect such managers to focus more of their efforts on internal controls and less on 
developing an integrity-based program.  
The changes to the OSG that emphasize a strong ethical culture should help 
refocus management’s attention. However, section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley competes with 
                                                                                                                                                              
156. See Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of 
Motivation Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 Org. Behav. & Human Dec. Processes 25 (1999) 
(finding that in agency situations, principals have a bias towards assuming that their agents are more 
motivated by extrinsic rewards (such as pay and job security ), as opposed to intrinsic rewards, than they 
are). A 2005 survey of 95 large firms by Ernst and Young found that 53 percent of firms had increased their 
level of monitoring in the last 18 months and 50 percent plan to further increase their programs in the next 
18 months. Ernst & Young, Corporate Regulatory Compliance Practices 28 (2005) (available online at 
www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/Compliance_Survey_-
_Corporate_Regulatory_Compliance/$file/CorporateRegulatoryCompliance.pdf -). In addition, 49 percent 
of firms have moved to centralize their monitoring programs, and another 41 percent plan to do so in the 
future. Id.
157. See ACFE 2002, supra note 16, at 12 (2002) (finding that based on a scale from 1 
(effective) to 8 (ineffective) managers ranked internal controls 1.62 on average, but ranked anonymous 
reporting and ethics training 5.02 and 4.86 respectively). 
158. See Langevoort, supra note 116, at 105 and 113–14 (stating that “integrity-based systems 
will often deliberately be designed in such a way that they look particularly leaky” and that it is a natural 




the OSG and encourages management to focus on internal controls. Section 404 and its 
reporting requirements place a priority on internal controls and consume management’s 
time.159 Thus, even if the OSG legitimizes a focus on the firm’s corporate culture, the 
demands of section 404 leave management with little time and resources to devote to 
those matters, and we continue to have misguided executives. 
The misleading executive, on the other hand, intentionally seeks only to adopt a 
“paper” program and to decouple it from actual operations. These managers are aware 
that prosecutors are typically unable to distinguish between sincere and insincere 
attempts at implementing a compliance program, and therefore seek only to adopt the 
appearance of being a “good corporate citizen.”160 These managers use compliance 
programs as insurance to protect the firm and themselves from liability for illegal 
behavior that results from the true corporate culture they foster inside the firm.161 The 
remainder of this section considers potential reforms to encourage both types of managers 
to adopt integrity-based programs. 
B. Encouraging Integrity-Based Programs 
The behavior of corporations depends on both its hardware and software. 
Hardware refers to the firm’s “structures and processes,” while software refers to the 
“norms and culture” of the firm. 162 As stated by Beinhocker, “the two sides must be 
consistent and mutually reinforcing to create a coherent social architecture.”163 The law 
is, of course, limited in its ability to shape a firm’s social architecture, but it can directly 
                                                                                                                                                              
159. See Matt Krantz, More finance chiefs are dropping out, USA Today, March 25, 2005, at 
1B (noting that more and more CFOs are quitting their jobs because of the time demands of SOX and the 
way it has changed the nature of their job). 
160. Laufer, supra note 15, at 1405–07. 
161. Id.
162. See Eric D. Beinhocker, The Adaptable Corporation, The McKinsey Q., Number 2, at 
77, 84 (2006).  
163. Id. (referring to corporate strategy, but consistent with our discussion of integrity-based 
programs).   
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influence the firm’s hardware and indirectly influence the firm’s software. Influencing 
positive change in the firm’s software through integrity-based programs should be the 
primary goal of any legislative intervention, including interventions involving the firm’s 
hardware. The primary means of influencing the firm’s software is through top 
management’s commitment to an integrity-based program.164
1. Hardware Fixes 
In general, we should be reluctant to have the law mandate specific hardware 
features, as a one-size-fits-all approach rarely works and firms need flexibility to adapt 
their compliance programs to their unique situations. In addition, once the law mandates 
a certain structure, experimentation on new ways of doing things is at-risk of being cut-
off. Certain hardware requirements, however, can potentially increase commitment to 
ethics and alter priorities without interfering substantially with management’s need for 
flexibility. For example, the ethics codes requirements under Sarbanes Oxley and the 
SEC implementing rules provide only general guidelines and leave corporations with the 
flexibility to develop their own content.165 Although a code of ethics as a hardware 
requirement can have a positive impact on intentions to behave ethically,166 they require 
the commitment of top management to ensure that they have a significant impact. To this 
end, a code of ethics can be supplemented by mechanisms that require direct leadership 
                                                                                                                                                              
164. See Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems: Influences of 
Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors, 42 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 41, 52–53 (1999) [hereinafter, 
Weaver et al., Control Systems]. 
165. Note: The Good, The Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Conduct: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Problem of Legislating Good Behavior, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2123, 2135–36 (2003). This 
article goes on to argue that the flexibility granted to firms to draft their own codes and then disclose those 
codes will have little effect on improving ethical behavior, and may actually be counterproductive. Id. at 
2124–25. 
166. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (finding that the presence of a code of 
ethics creates the perception amongst employees that the firm supports ethical behavior and therefore 
improves attitudes toward that behavior); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text  (noting a study 
that finds financial officers are more likely to use the company’s ethics code in strategic decisions if they 
have had training on the code, which has a positive impact on their perceived behavioral control). 
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involvement, allow employees to voice concerns directly to leadership, and require 
companies to actively evaluate the effectiveness of their ethics programs.  
The first step in focusing top management’s attention on organizational ethics and 
legitimizing the importance of compliance programs is to require their time and attention 
to these matters.  Many firms’ initial response to the organizational sentencing guidelines 
was to adopt the necessary structures and processes in form, but in a manner that did little 
to change top management’s involvement.167 Many firms implemented their programs 
simply by tacking compliance program responsibilities onto the roles of certain officers 
and utilizing existing corporate structures.168 For example, over half the firms in a survey 
conducted in the mid-1990s assigned a specific officer to be in charge of the compliance 
program, but 54 percent of those firms indicated that the officer spent less than 10 percent 
of his or her time on ethics and compliance issues.169 CEOs also did not increase their 
involvement. Two-thirds of ethics and compliance officers indicated that their CEO had 
communicated with them on ethics issues no more than two times per year.170 In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                              
167. The lengths to which management will go to avoid involvement in a compliance program 
are illustrated in Bishop v. PCS Administration, Inc., 2006 WL 1460032 (N.D.Ill.), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P. 
93,882, 24 IER Cases 1096. In Bishop, PCS appointed the plaintiff, an in-house counsel, to be the 
company’s Compliance Officer. Id. at *3. After reading the OSG’s requirements that high level personnel 
head the compliance program, the plaintiff suggested that someone else head the program and she would 
provide support. Id. This suggestion was rejected, as was her argument that the firm needed a compliance 
committee. Id. at *4. The plaintiff was then fired from the company, which she alleged was due to these 
efforts to prevent fraud. Id. at 5. 
168. Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990s: An Empirical Study, 
18 J. of Bus. Ethics 283, 283 (1999) [hereinafter, Weaver et al., Ethics Practices] (reporting the results of 
an empirical study finding that top management’s commitment to the ethics program was the most 
important predictor of whether a firm would adopt a values-oriented compliance program, as opposed to a 
strictly compliance-oriented program); Gary R. Weaver et al, Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social 
Performance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42 Acad. of 
Mgmt. J. 539, 547–48 (1999) [hereinafter Weaver et al. Integrated and Decoupled] (reporting the results of 
an empirical study finding that top management commitment was related to a firm adopting an integrated 
ethics program, as opposed to a program that could be easily established for window-dressing purposes and 
have no actual impact on day-to-day decision making). 
169. Weaver et al., Ethics Practices, supra note 168, at 288. Thirteen percent of the 
respondents indicated that the officer spends 100 percent of his or her time on ethics and compliance issues. 
Id.
170. Id. at 291. 
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one-third of CEOs had not attended a meeting with ethics as a primary focus, and an 
additional one-third had only attended one such meeting in the last year.171 A more recent 
survey found that less than 40 percent of US boards received ethics and compliance 
training.172
In recognition of such deficiencies, the revised sentencing guidelines included 
provisions requiring: (1) “high-level personnel” “ensure” the effectiveness of the 
program; (2) leadership “be knowledgeable” about the program; (3) individuals in charge 
of the compliance program’s operations, such as the Chief Ethics Officer, have “direct 
access” to the board of directors (or a subcommittee),173 and they should report at least 
annually to the board (or subcommittee) on the effectiveness of the program;174 and (4) 
all corporate officers, including the board of directors, receive ethics training.175  
All such changes should go a long way in ensuring that the top management and 
the board of directors is not “out of touch” with the ethical environment of the 
organization.176 In addition, Sarbanes Oxley ensures that officers and directors are fully 
aware of their firm’s ethical environment through its requirement that the audit committee 
have a mechanism in place to hear concerns about questionable behavior.177 Such 
requirements that directly involve the functioning of the officers and directors of the firm 
legitimize the importance of maintaining the ethical environment of the firm and should 
                                                                                                                                                              
171. Id.
172. Ronald E. Berenbeim & Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Ethics Programs: The Role of the Board: A 
Global Study (Conference Board Report) 31 (2004). 
173. U.S Sentencing Guidelines Manual 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). 
174. U.S Sentencing Guidelines Manual Application note 2. 
175. U.S Sentencing Guidelines Manual 8B2.1(b)(4). 
176. Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 70 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 1195, 1208–1209 (2005) (citing her own research which finds “senior managers have 
significantly more positive perceptions of organizational ethics when compared to rank-and-file 
employees. . . . [they] are less likely to see ethics initiatives cynically and are more likely to perceive the 
internal ethical environment to be supportive of ethical conduct in the organization.”). 
177. Sarbanes Oxley 301(4); see also Trevino, supra note 176,  at 1208 (stating that CEOs are 
“out of touch” with their firms’ ethical climates because “due to fear and futility concerns, employees are 
unlikely to report ethical problems up the chain”).   
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alter the priorities of the misguided manager. Likewise, the board of directors has access 
to information, and incentives to digest that information, that will make them better 
monitors of the misleading manager. 
The next step in this line of reforms should be to require an ethics committee. In 
the US, board level oversight of the ethics and compliance program is typically done by 
an audit committee.178 In a recent Conference Board study, none of the corporations that 
responded to their survey had an ethics committee overseeing their compliance 
program.179 By contrast, 63 percent of Japanese companies used an ethics committee.180 
The authors of the Conference Board report state that having a committee responsible for 
the compliance and ethics program of the firm allows the committee members to develop 
expertise on the topic and requires them to devote specific time to these issues.181  
An additional hardware adjustment is the requirement under the OSG that firms 
“take reasonable steps. . . .to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s 
compliance and ethics program.”182 The OSG creates a proactive obligation on firms to 
evaluate their programs on a regular basis, whereas the old standard only required firms 
to evaluate their programs in reaction to a violation.183 This is a requirement that needs to 
be taken seriously by corporations, prosecutors, and judges. Any leniency granted to a 
firm under the OSG should require the firm to demonstrate that it has made sincere, good 
                                                                                                                                                              
178. 77% of the firms that responded to the survey used an audit committee. Berenbeim and. 
Kaplan, supra note 172, at 13.  
179. Id. at 13. Their survey included 77 large US corporations. Id. at 34. 18 percent of firms 
used a governance committee. Id. at 13. 
180. Id.
181. Id. at 13. 
182. U.S Sentencing Guidelines Manual 8B2.1(b)(5)(b). 
183. Corporate Compliance Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, Corporate Compliance 
Survey, 60 Bus. Lawyer 1759, 1784 (2005). 
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faith attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs.184 Langevoort argues that the 
overall evaluation of compliance programs should be based on industry best practices. 185 
I firmly agree and further argue that the use of a best practices standard is especially 
important for judging firms’ efforts at evaluating their programs.  
Evaluation of compliance programs is an area where there is a need for innovation 
and sharing of experiences. Finding meaningful metrics is a significant challenge. One 
compliance officer compares measuring the effectiveness of compliance programs to 
determining if building a lighthouse was an effective use of resources: “How many ships 
didn’t crash because the lighthouse was built?” 186 Dallas argues that the OSG should 
require firms to assess their ethical climate.187 Determining an ethical climate is typically 
done through the use of a questionnaire,188 however, only 11 percent of US companies in 
a recent Conference Board survey used employee surveys to test the effectiveness of their 
programs.189
2. Software Fixes 
Hardware fixes will not work without a change in the firm’s software. For 
example, requiring firms to provide a mechanism for anonymous reporting should 
improve employee attitudes toward the behavior and increase the reporting of 
                                                                                                                                                              
184. See Public Hearing Held by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, Plenary Session I, November 14, 2002, at 81–83 (testimony of Lynn Sharp Paine) (available 
online at: http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ph11_02/plenary1.pdf).  
185. Langevoort, supra note 116, at 115. 
186. Ernst & Young, Corporate Regulatory Compliance Practices 27 (2005) (available online 
at www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/Compliance_Survey_-
_Corporate_Regulatory_Compliance/$file/CorporateRegulatoryCompliance.pdf). The survey respondents 
were 95 firms (mostly from the Fortune 1000) in highly regulated industries (thus, firms with the resources 
and incentives to adopt sophisticated compliance programs). Id. at 1. 
187. Id. at 61–63. 
188. Id. at 23–29. See also Public Hearing Held by Ad Hoc Advisory Group, supra at 99–103 
(providing commentary on the use of employee surveys and other possible metrics to determine the 
effectiveness of a compliance program). 
189. Berenbeim & Kaplan, supra note 172, at 22. For a potential explanation of this low 




misconduct.190  However, this mechanism will do little to change attitudes if employees 
do not believe they will actually have anonymity.191 To actually change intentions, the 
firm must also improve the corporate culture around the hardware mechanisms, such as 
through an integrity-based compliance program.192 The law can encourage the 
development of ethical corporate culture by encouraging firms and mediating groups to 
work towards developing best practices.  Further, the government could remove legal 
barriers which currently discourage the development of effective integrity-based 
programs. 
The law can only influence a firm’s culture indirectly. For example, studies by 
Weaver and colleagues found that regulatory pressures through the organizational 
sentencing guidelines influenced the scope of the corporation’s compliance program (i.e., 
hardware mechanisms, especially those that are easily decoupled from actual operations) 
but not the implementation of an integrity-based program.193 Likewise, Stevens and 
colleagues found that regulatory pressures were unsuccessful in encouraging financial 
executives to use the company’s code of ethics in strategic decision making.194 
Conversely, pressure from market participants, such as customers, suppliers, banks, and 
shareholders, did make it more likely that executives would actually utilize the code of 
                                                                                                                                                              
190. For example, the study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners found that firms 
without a hotline suffered $200,000 in losses and took 24 months to detect the fraud, compared to $100,000 
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supra note 4, at 35. The report does not provide data on which firms had mechanisms (such as fraud 
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191. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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ethics.195 Other factors that had a positive impact on the use of the code included beliefs 
that following the code of ethics would help create an ethical corporate culture and 
promote a positive image to stakeholders.196 Thus, market pressures and perceived 
operating benefits from an ethical culture, but not regulatory pressure, are key 
mechanisms for getting firms to meaningfully implement their compliance programs 
through changes in their software.  
Instructive for achieving our goal of software change is Sturm’s context-based 
problem-solving approach to reducing employment discrimination caused by a firm’s 
corporate culture.197 Sturm’s approach falls under the emerging category of regulation 
referred to as “new governance.”198 For Sturm, the law’s role in encouraging the adoption 
of effective compliance programs is not only to provide incentives through liability 
avoidance, but also to provide “legitimacy, clout, and regular consideration” to issues that 
were “typically neglected or undervalued.”199 The potential for liability, however, creates 
a tension between actions that create economic benefits and are ethically responsible, on 
the one hand, and strategic actions designed to protect the firm from legal actions, on the 
other.200
                                                                                                                                                              
195. Id. at 183, 188. 
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101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 475–76 (2001) (arguing that a rule-enforcement approach to discrimination 
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Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004) (providing an exhaustive overview of new governance regulation); Edward 
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2108 (2005) (describing the organizational sentencing guidelines as one example of “new public 
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199. Sturm, supra note 197, at 521. 
200. Sturm, supra note 197, at 522. 
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To balance these tensions, Sturm recognizes the importance of key intermediary 
groups, such as non-governmental organizations and professional networks, to mediating 
the relationship between the law and organizations.201 These actors include professionals 
within the company, consulting firms, lawyers, employee groups, institutional investors, 
and insurance companies. All of these groups have the potential to develop and then 
widely disseminate knowledge on best practices for implementing integrity-based 
programs.202 Each group, however, also has incentives to work against this approach. For 
example, firms may not wish to share information on an ethics program that gives them a 
competitive advantage, and lawyers may counsel against collecting information that 
could be used against the firm in a lawsuit.203  
Take insurance companies for example. Griffith argues that corporations should 
be required to disclose the premiums they pay for directors’ and officers’ insurance, as 
those premiums provide market participants with valuable information on the quality of 
the firm’s corporate governance.204 In determining their premiums, insurance agents 
specifically ask firms about their corporate culture, such as “How does ‘bad news’ flow 
upward within the organization? Does the corporate culture encourage such news to be 
brought to the attention of senior management?”205 To the extent that insurance 
companies focus on these matters of managing ethical behavior and develop expertise in 
analyzing a firm’s culture and implementation of its compliance program, firms have an 
incentive to adopt an integrity-based program to receive lower premiums and, more 
                                                                                                                                                              
201. Id. at 523. 
202. Id. at 524–37. 
203. Id. at 545; See also infra notes 215-20 (discussing the litigation dilemma faced by firms). 
204. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of 
Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1150–51 
(2006). 
205. Id. at 1177–78. 
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importantly, to send the right signals to the market through the size of their premiums.206 
Insurance companies, may, however, simply conduct more narrow reviews limited only to 
factors that reduce the probability they will have to make a pay-out for a covered claim, 
and they will not necessarily encourage practices that lead to the sharing of best 
practices.207 In addition, firms may be reluctant to have an insurance company conduct a 
complete audit, which potentially opens the firm to liability for uncorrected problems that 
were uncovered in the audit.208
Other mediating groups, with possibly a greater potential for change, can also be 
indirectly encouraged to play a more significant role in this area. As mentioned earlier as 
a hardware fix, prosecutors and judges should take seriously the OSG’s requirement that 
firms regularly evaluate their programs. They should grant leniency only to those firms 
that can demonstrate that they are engaging in “best practices” to evaluate their program’s 
effectiveness.209 Through this requirement, firms will likely work with mediating 
organizations, such as consulting firms and other compliance professionals, which will 
further help in the development and then dissemination of effective techniques.210 Some 
movement in this area is already occurring in response to Sarbanes Oxley’s ethics codes 
requirements and the OSG’s recent requirements relating to the establishment of ethical 
corporate culture. For example, as of September 2006, the Society of Corporate 
Compliance and Ethics is offering an examination for those seeking to be a certified 
Compliance and Ethics Professional.211
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210. Sturm, supra note 197, at 559. 
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Kraweic is rightly concerned that the involvement of mediating groups may lead 
to compliance professionals engaging in self-interested behavior and encouraging firms 
to adopt unnecessary and ineffective mechanisms that serve primarily to support the 
importance of these groups to the organization.212 As Bagenstos states, best practices 
“would merely be the practices that are ‘best’ for . . . the intermediaries themselves.”213 
This tendency can be countered, however, by government encouragement and 
development of knowledge and data on what makes a compliance program effective and 
by the sharing of best practices as suggested by Sturm. Following what Lobel refers to as 
“legal orchestration,” government should also more actively support the stakeholder 
networks necessary to achieve these goals. 214
In addition to taking steps to encourage firms and mediating groups to work 
towards developing best practices, the government should remove or minimize the legal 
hurdles preventing firms from collecting and utilizing the information necessary to 
evaluate their software and then move towards implementing more effective compliance 
programs. A primary hurdle is the so-called “litigation dilemma” faced by firms.215 If a 
corporation follows the requirements for an effective program under the sentencing 
guidelines, then the information it collects during monitoring and auditing its 
performance could be used against it in litigation.216 In addition, it is becoming routine 
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for prosecutors to request that corporations waive attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection to receive a reduced culpability score under the OSG.217 These factors 
prevent the collection and flow of information within the firm that is necessary for the 
development of an effective program.218 Especially harmful for developing integrity-
based programs is that even information on employee attitudes and perceived subjective 
norms can be used against the firm in litigation.219 Removing the litigation dilemma 
through some form of selective privilege for self-auditing220 or placing limits on the use 
of waivers221 is necessary to allow firms to develop an understanding of their corporate 
culture and work towards improving the ethical intentions and behaviors of employees. 
Conclusion 
Although the media attention on the scandals leading up to Sarbanes Oxley was 
focused primarily on the Ken Lays, Jeff Skillings, and Andrew Fastows of the C-Suite, a 
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wide variety of employees at all levels of the firm participated in or were at least aware of 
the fraudulent activities that permeated their corporations.222 The regulatory challenge is 
to find ways that the law can encourage those employees to report misconduct of 
superiors and co-workers, and more importantly, to refuse to engage in fraudulent 
practices in the first place. Great strides will be taken towards this goal if firms adopt 
integrity-based compliance programs. Empirical evidence provides strong support that 
such programs have a positive impact on employee attitudes, improve subjective norms, 
increase perceived behavior control, and strengthen moral obligations. Through hardware 
mechanisms required by Sarbanes Oxley, SEC implementing rules, and the OSG, we are 
moving in the direction of improving corporate compliance programs and encouraging 
the managerial commitment necessary for firms to develop ethical corporate cultures. To 
complement these hardware mechanisms, the government should find new ways of 
encouraging mediating groups to develop and share best practices, as well as place 
pressure on firms to adopt those practices. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
222. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing 
Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron 296–97 (2003) (discussing the various movie and song parodies the 
members of Enron’s broadband finance group developed to celebrate their “earnings achievements” done 
through “smoke and mirrors,” which the general counsel reportedly ordered destroyed after the party); 
Scott Green, Manager’s Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Improving Internal Controls to Prevent 
Fraud 13 (2004) (noting how employees and managers in 22 different businesses were involved in CUC 
International’s successful efforts to hide over $500 million in fake profits from an acquiring company).   
 46
